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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

;

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

JEFFREY W. ROCHELL,

t

Case No, 920309-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992), in
the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the officer's protective frisk supported by a

reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous?
This Court has implied that a deferential, clearly
erroneous standard of review applies to a trial court's
determination of reasonable suspicion in support of a protective
frisk.

State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App.) ("the

record contains sufficient

evidence

that the officers in this

case were justified in frisking defendant") (emphasis added),
cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).

Because a protective

frisk must be based on reasonable suspicion that a person is
armed, it is appropriate to apply a clearly erroneous standard,
the general standard for reasonable suspicion rulings.

See State

v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181f 183 (Utah 198?) (trial court
determination of reasonable suspicion will not be reversed on
appeal unless it is clearly erroneous); State v. Svkes, Case No.
910554-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. October 19, 1992) (trial
court determination of reasonable suspicion should not be
overturned unless it is clearly erroneous).

But see State v.

Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App.) (applying nondeferential,
"correction of error" standard in reversing trial court's
reasonable suspicion determination), cert, denied,

P.2d

(Utah 1992).
2.

Was defendant's detention beyond the initial

purposes of the traffic stop supported by a reasonable suspicion
of other more serious criminal activity?
A trial court's ruling on this question is also
reversed on appeal only if clearly erroneous.

State v. Robinson.

797 P.2d 431, 436-437 (Utah App. 1990).
3.

Was defendant's consent to search his vehicle

sufficiently attenuated from the alleged improper protective
frisk and detention?

Additionally, notwithstanding defendant's

consent, was contraband seized from his vehicle tainted by the
alleged improper protective frisk and detention?
Defendant failed to preserve for review any argument
concerning the validity of his consent to search the vehicle.
2

State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1992).

As for his

allegations of taint resulting from the protective frisk and
detention, the standard of review for a trial court's reasonable
suspicion determination —
4.

stated above —

applies here also.

Was the vehicle search justified as incident to

defendant's arrest?
Because defendant does not challenge the validity of
his arrest, or the trial court's conclusion that the vehicle
search was justified as incident to his arrest, no standard of
review for this issue need be set forth.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jeffrey W. Rochell, was charged with
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1992); possession of a controlled
substance (cocaine) without tax stamps affixed, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106 (1992);
speeding, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
41-6-46(2)(d) (Supp. 1992); open container of liquor in or about
a vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 41-6-44.20 (Supp. 1992) (R. 10-12).
3

Defendant filed a motion to suppress contraband
allegedly seized in violation of the fourth amendment and article
I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 17).
After conducting a suppression hearing, the trial court
denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. 38, 40-49).
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the
reduced offense of possession of a controlled substance
(cocaine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992), which preserved defendant's
right to appeal the suppression ruling (see State v. Serv, 758
P.2d 935, 937-40 (Utah App. 1988)) (R. 50-54).
The trial court sentenced defendant to zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison and imposed various fines and fees
(R. 66). The court then stayed defendant's sentence and placed
him on three years probation under certain specified conditions
(R. 66-67).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The following pertinent evidence was presented at the
hearing on defendant's motion to suppress.

It supports the trial

court's findings.l
On the evening of June 5, 1991, Trooper Maycock of the
Utah Highway Patrol stopped defendant's vehicle on the northbound

1

Although the trial court's written Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law are contained in the record before this Court,
they have not been numbered. A copy of the court's ruling is
contained in Addendum B and the State will hereafter cite this
Court to Addendum B when referring to the trial court's written
findings and conclusions.
4

lane of 1-15, near north Salt Lake, for speeding (Transcript of
suppression hearing, March 18, 1992 [T.] at 3). Immediately upon
being stopped, defendant exited his vehicle and began walking
toward Trooper Maycock (T. 4). Defendant's passenger remained
seated inside the car.

Although he had anticipated a routine

traffic stop, Trooper Maycock was "alerted" by defendant's
behavior because it was unusual for a stopped driver to approach
his patrol car (T. 12). The officer proceeded to carry out the
traffic stop, making sure he could see defendant's hands (T. 12).
Trooper Maycock asked defendant for his driver's
license, and in so doing, noticed the smell of alcohol on
defendant's breath (T. 4). Defendant produced a valid Utah
drivers' license, and the officer asked how much he had had to
drink (T. 4). Defendant replied, "One beer" (T. 4). Trooper
Maycock then asked defendant to perform a horizontal gaze
nystagmus test to determine whether he was unlawfully intoxicated
(T. 4). After defendant successfully completed the test, Trooper
Maycock informed him that he had been stopped for a speeding
violation (T. 5, 15).
The officer then asked to see defendant's vehicle
registration (T. 5, 15). Defendant returned to his vehicle to
retrieve the registration, followed by Trooper Maycock who was
concerned that defendant might have a weapon in the vehicle (T.
17).

When defendant opened the passenger side door to access the

glove compartment, a plastic cup fell out, spilling alcohol on
the ground (T. 5). The officer picked up the cup, checked the
5

smell, and returned it to defendant's passenger, who identified
himself as Billy Gene Miller (T. 5).
Trooper Maycock then asked defendant to sit in his
(defendant's) vehicle while he returned to the patrol car to
write out citations (T. 6). The officer cited defendant for the
speeding and seat belt violations and Miller for the open
container violation.

He then returned to defendant's vehicle and

asked both defendant and Miller to step to the front of the car
where he advised them that only Miller had been cited for the
open container violation (T. 7). However, based on his
observation of the open container, and the smell of alcohol on
both men, Trooper Maycock indicated that he wanted to search the
driver's side area of defendant's vehicle for additional
containers, and that if he found one, he would cite defendant for
that violation as well (T. 7, 25).
Because searching the vehicle would necessitate having
his back to both men, Trooper Maycock first inquired whether
either defendant or Miller had any weapons (T. 7, 23, 29). Both
men said "No," and Miller immediately began emptying his pockets
(T. 7). However, Trooper Maycock noticed a large bulge inside
the left front pocket of defendant's shorts (T. 8). Fearing that
the bulge was some type of a pocket knife, the officer lightly
tapped it, determined that it was hard, and asked "What do you
have in your pocket?" (T. 8). Defendant replied that he didn't
have a weapon and produced a set of keys (T. 8)*

6

Because there was still a noticeable bulge in
defendant's pocket, the officer lightly tapped it again, noted
that it was still hard, and asked, "What's that?" (T. 8).
Trooper Maycock then explained that he didn't like the "thought
of getting stuck with a pen knife" (T. 9). Defendant reached
into his pocket a second time and produced a handful of loose
change (T. 9). In so doing, he exposed a plastic baggie
containing a white powdery substance (T. 9). The officer asked,
"What's that baggy [sic]" and defendant replied, "Nothing" (T.
9).

Defendant then attempted to conceal the baggie behind his

back (T. 9).
Another officer, who had just arrived on the scene,
approached from behind defendant.2

After observing defendant's

attempts to conceal the baggie behind his back, Officer Garrido
seized the contraband (T. 10). Defendant was immediately
arrested for possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) (T.
Following the administration of Miranda warnings,3 the

10).

officers inquired whether there was "any other dope in the car"
(T. 10). Defendant said "Yes," and "advised" the officers "where
it could be found" (T. 10). The officers then retrieved
additional contraband from "between the cushions of the passenger
seat" (T. 10).
2

Trooper Maycock was contacted by Officer Garrido while
sitting in his patrol vehicle writing out the initial citations.
Officer Garrido requested Trooper Maycock's location so that he
could return some handcuffs he had borrowed to make an earlier
arrest (T. 6).
3

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the contraband
seized on the ground that it had been obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution (R. 17). In a supporting memorandum defendant
alleged that Trooper Maycock lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk
him for weapons and that additional contraband discovered in his
vehicle was "fruit discovered from the previous illegal search of
defendant's person and should be excluded" (R. 18-28) (copies of
defendant's motion and memorandum are contained in Addendum A ) .
At a hearing on the matter, defendant argued that
Trooper Maycock lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk him because
"there was nothing to alert the officer that [he and Miller] had
any weapons on them" (T. 39). Additionally, defendant argued
that the officer "exceeded the duration and the scope of his
initial stop when he ordered [defendant and Miller] to step
forward so he [could] search them and search the vehicle" (T.
41).

Finally, defendant argued that the vehicle search was not

supported by probable cause (T. 41) (a complete copy of defense
counsel's argument is contained in Addendum A ) .
The trial court denied defendant's motion on the
grounds that the protective frisk and detention were reasonable
and that the search of the vehicle was supported by probable
cause.

Additionally, the court concluded that the seizure of

contraband from defendant's vehicle was justified as incident to
his arrest (Addendum B ) .

8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's determination of reasonableness with
respect to the protective frisk and the scope of the detention is
not clearly erroneous.

Concerning the officer's protective

frisk, the officer's observation of a noticeable bulge in
defendant's pocket reasonably gave rise to his suspicion that
defendant was armed and potentially dangerous.

The

reasonableness of the officer's fear is not overcome by the fact
that defendant and his passenger were outside the vehicle at the
time of the frisk; moreover, as recently recognized by this
Court, roadside traffic stops are inherently dangerous.
Additionally, the protective frisk was no more intrusive than
necessary to dispel or confirm the officer's suspicion of a
concealed weapon.
As for the scope of the detention beyond the initial
purposes of the traffic stop, the officer had at least a
reasonable suspicion that defendant and his passenger were
involved in other more serious criminal activity.

During the

course of investigating defendant's driver's license the officer
smelled alcohol on the breath of both men and defendant admitted
to having had one beer.

Additionally, the officer observed an

open container of alcohol fall from the passenger compartment
when defendant attempted to retrieve the vehicle registration.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, further detention
was justified to investigate for consumption of alcohol while
driving.

9

The trial court's conclusion that the subsequent search
of defendant's vehicle was justified as incident to his arrest
was similarly proper and should be affirmed.

Defendant was

arrested following the protective frisk which revealed the
presence of contraband on his person.

Contemporaneous with his

arrest for possession of a controlled substance (cocaine),
defendant's vehicle was searched for additional contraband.
Because the contraband found on defendant's person provided
probable cause for his arrest independent of the contraband later
seized from his vehicle and because defendant's vehicle was
within his immediate control at the time of his arrest, the
contraband found therein was admissible.
Finally, because the vehicle search was justified as
incident to defendant's arrest, there is no need to consider
whether the search would be justified under the "automobile
exception," or any other exception to the warrant requirement.
Although defendant challenges the vehicle search on the ground
that his consent was not sufficiently attenuated from alleged
prior illegalities, he failed to preserve any argument concerning
his consent in the trial court and has thus waived its
consideration on appeal. As for defendant's additional
allegations of taint stemming from the protective frisk and the
scope of detention, he has failed to demonstrate that either the
protective frisk or the detention were improper.

Thus, it is not

necessary for the State, or this Court, to engage in a taint
analysis.
10

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE OFFICER'S PROTECTIVE FRISK WAS SUPPORTED
BY A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT DEFENDANT WAS
ARMED AND DANGEROUS
In Point I of his brief defendant asserts that because
Trooper Maycock "did not initially frisk [him] upon confronting
him," nor during the course of administering a subsequent field
sobriety test, the officer could not have reasonably suspected
that he was "armed and dangerous" (Br. of Appellant [App.] at
15).

As support for his assertion defendant argues that "some 15

to 25 minutes after the initial stop, neither [he] nor his
passenger had done anything to suggest they were armed and
dangerous" (Br. of App. at 15). Because defendant's argument
ignores the trial court's factual findings that the "officer
noticed a bulge in defendant's left front pocket" (Addendum B),
and that the officer reasonably "believed [the bulge to be] a
knife or other weapon" (Addendum B), his argument lacks merit and
should be rejected.
It is permissible for an officer "who reasonably
suspects that an individual may be armed and dangerous, to pat
down the outer clothing of that individual in a search for
concealed objects which might be used as instruments of assault."
State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App.) (quotation
omitted), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989).

See also State

v. Bradford, No. 910282-CA, slip op. at 5 (Utah App. October 14,
1992); State v. Rovbal, 716 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986); Utah Code
11

Ann. § 77-7-16 (1990)/

The reasonableness of a protective

frisk is assessed under an objective standard: "[W]ould the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the
search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the
action taken was appropriate?"

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22

(1968) (quotation and citations omitted).

See also Avala, 762

P.2d at 1111 ("The standard is whether a reasonably prudent man
under the circumstances would believe that his safety or that of
others was in jeopardy").

Thus, it is not "essential" that the

officer actually be in fear, or that he be absolutely certain
that the suspect is armed.

Rovbal, 716 P.2d at 293.

Trooper Maycock's protective frisk was based on a
reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous.
Determining that he should search the driver's side area of the
vehicle for an additional open container,5 Trooper Maycock asked
defendant and Miller to step away from the vehicle (T. 6). See
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (driver
stopped for traffic violation may be ordered out of vehicle for
purposes of officer safety); Rovbal, 716 P.2d at 293-94
(recognizing "need of officers to take reasonable precautions to
insure their safety").
A

After defendant and Miller exited the

Section 77-7-16 provides:
A peace officer who has stopped a person
temporarily for questioning may frisk the
person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably
believes he or any other person is in danger.

5

Defendant's allegations concerning the propriety of the
vehicle search are addressed in Point IV of this brief.
12

vehicle, Trooper Maycock observed a "bulge" in the left front
pocket of defendant's shorts, the dimensions of which reasonably
led the officer to believe that defendant was concealing a type
of pocket knife and that he should perform a protective frisk
before searching the vehicle (T. 8).
As recently noted by this Court,"roadside traffic stops
are particularly dangerous when weapons may be present in the
area immediately surrounding a suspect."
CA, slip op. at 4.

Bradford, No. 910282-

See also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,

1047-49 n.13 (1983) ("investigative detentions involving suspects
in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police
officers," approximately 30% of police shootings occur when an
officer approaches a suspect seated in a vehicle); State v.
Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1989) (officer shot without
warning as he approached vehicle); 3 W. LaFave, Search
Seizure,

and

§ 9.4(a) n.26 (1987) (noting that more officers are shot

while conducting field interrogations than while dealing with
known felons and that 43% of officer shootings that occur
pursuant to a vehicle stop, take place after the initial contact
has been made).

In Bradford. this Court further noted that "an

officer's reasonable fear" is "not overcome" by the "the fact,
taken in isolation, that a suspect is outside a vehicle while an
officer is conducting a search."

Id. at 5.

See State v. Dorsev,

731 P.2d 1085, 1093 n.3 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J.f concurring)
(rejecting defendant's contention that it was "unrealistic" for
officers to fear that defendants presented a threat to their
13

safety since they were "standing by the rear of the truck under
control of several officers holding drawn weapons").

See also

Long, 463 U.S. at 1051 (rejecting a similar claim, reasoning that
a suspect "despite being under the brief control of a police
officer, [could] reach into his clothing and retrieve a weapon").
Additionally, the noticeable bulge in defendant's
pocket reasonably supported Trooper Maycock's belief that
defendant had access to a concealed weapon.

Stout v. State, 304

Ark. 610, 804 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Ark. 1991) (protective frisk
justified in order to determine that "obvious bulge" in suspect's
jacket was not a weapon); United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059,
1067 n.10 (7th Cir. 1990) (protective frisk justified by
officer's observation of a "heavy object" protruding from
suspect's jacket pocket).

See 3 W. LaFave, Search

9.4(a) n.44-45 (1987 & Supp. 1992).

and Seizure,

§

Moreover, the officer's

protective frisk was not overly intrusive, consisting of light
taps on the outside of defendant's pocket.

Terxy, 392 U.S. at 6,

30 (upholding more aggressive frisk where the officer "grabbed
petitioner Terry, spun him around . . . and patted down the
outside of his clothing," on the ground that the frisk did not
invade Terry's person beyond the outer surfaces of his clothes
and was thus confined to what was minimally necessary to discover
the suspected weapon).
In light of the foregoing, defendant's unsupported
assertions fail to demonstrate that the trial court's
determination of reasonable suspicion to conduct a frisk was
14

clearly erroneous.

Avala, 762 P.2d at 1111; Mendoza, 748 P.2d

181, 183 (Utah 1987).

Based on his observations of the

suspicious bulge in defendant's pocket, Trooper Maycock's
protective frisk was reasonable.

Additionally, his light taps on

the outside of defendant's pocket were no more intrusive than
necessary to confirm or dispel his suspicion.
19 n.15.

Terry, 392 U.S. at

Thus, this Court should affirm the trial court's

determination that the officer's protective frisk was reasonable
and proper under the fourth amendment.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION BEYOND THE INITIAL
PURPOSES OF THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS JUSTIFIED BY
THE OFFICER'S REASONABLE SUSPICION OF OTHER
MORE SERIOUS CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
In Point II of his brief defendant asserts that
"Trooper Maycock's detention of [him] exceeded the scope of the
traffic stop and was not justified by a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity" (Br. of App. at 15). Additionally, defendant
asserts that "Trooper Maycock had no reason to search [him]," or
his vehicle (Br. of App. at 17). As defendant's allegations
concerning the reasonableness of the protective frisk are
addressed in Point I of this brief, and his allegations
concerning the propriety of the vehicle search will be addressed
in Point IV of this brief, the State's response here will focus
on the reasonableness of the detention.

Defendant's arguments

concerning the scope of his detention lack merit and should be
rejected.
As recently observed by this Court, "[a]fter stopping a
15

vehicle for a traffic violation, an officer may briefly detain
the vehicle and its occupants while he examines the vehicle
registration and the driver's license."

State v. Bradford, No.

910282-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. October 14, 1992) (quotations
and citations omitted).

However, once the driver has produced a

valid license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, the
occupants may not be further detained in the absence of a
reasonable suspicion of other serious criminal activity.

JEd. at

3-4.
Defendant acknowledges that the stop of his vehicle for
a traffic violation was justified at its inception (Br. of App.
at 16). Specifically, Trooper Maycock stopped defendant's car
for traveling sixty-five miles per hour in a fifty-five mile-perhour zone (T. 3), a clear violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-646(2)(d) (Supp. 1992).

See Bradford, No. 910282-CA, slip op. at

3 (police officer may stop a vehicle when the officer has
witnessed the commission of a traffic violation).

Defendant's

detention beyond the initial purposes of the traffic stop was
similarly justified based on observations by th€* officer during
that time which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of
defendant's participation in other more serious criminal
activity.

JEd. at 4.
During the course of his investigation Trooper Maycock

smelled alcohol on both defendant's and Miller's breath, and
defendant admitted that he had been drinking (T. 4, 6).
Additionally, the officer observed an open container of alcohol
16

fall from the passenger side of the vehicle when defendant
attempted to retrieve the vehicle registration from the glove
compartment (T. 5). At the very least, these circumstances gave
rise to a reasonable suspicion of alcohol use such that further
detention to investigate for consumption of alcohol while driving
was justified.

See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20(1) & (2) (Supp.

1992) (prohibiting consumption of alcoholic beverage or
possession of an open container while in a motor vehicle on a
highway).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, it is

hard to imagine what more an officer would need beyond the
circumstances present here: the smell of alcohol on both
defendant and his passenger, an open container of alcohol in the
passenger compartment, and defendant's admission that he had been
drinking.

See Bradford,. No. 910282-CA, slip op. at 5 (courts

will engage in a totality of the circumstances analysis to
determine whether there was a reasonable suspicion of
criminality).
Although not directly so stating, the trial court
implicitly determined that the scope of defendant's detention was
supported by at least a reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct
(Addendum B). 6

Because defendant's unsupported assertions fail

to demonstrate that the trial court's determination was clearly
erroneous, this Court should affirm.

State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d

*
In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial
court concluded that Trooper Maycock "had probable cause to believe
that another alcoholic beverage was in the vehicle" (Addendum B)
(emphasis added).
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431, 436-437 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181,
183 (Utah 1987).
POINT III
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE ANY ARGUMENT
CONCERNING THE VALIDITY OF HIS CONSENT TO
SEARCH THE VEHICLE IN THE TRIAL COURT AND HAS
THUS WAIVED ITS CONSIDERATION ON APPEAL; AS
FOR DEFENDANT'S ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS OF
TAINT, HE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT EITHER
THE DETENTION OR THE PROTECTIVE FRISK WERE
ILLEGAL; THUS, NEITHER THE STATE NOR THIS
COURT NEED ENGAGE IN A TAINT ANALYSIS
In Point III of his brief defendant asserts that
contraband discovered inside in his vehicle was illegally seized
(Br. of App. at 18). In so arguing, defendant primarily asserts
that his consent to search the vehicle was not sufficiently
attenuated from the officer's previous "illegal seizure of the
controlled substances from his front pocket" (Br. of App. at 18).
Additionally, defendant asserts that contraband found in his
vehicle "was discovered as a result of exploitation of the
illegal detention and search of [his] person" (Br. of App. at
18).

Because defendant failed to preserve any argument

concerning the validity of his consent to search the vehicle in
the trial court and because he has not demonstrated that the
detention or the protective frisk were illegal, this Court should
reject both arguments.
A.

Waiver of Consent Issue

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the physical
evidence against him in the trial court, broadly alleging that
the contraband had been illegally seized under the fourth
18

amendment and article I, section 14 of the state constitution (R.
17; see Addendum A).

In his supporting memorandum defendant

cursorily relied on Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963), and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)f to allege
that contraband "found in [his] vehicle [was] fruit discovered
from the previous illegal search of [his] person and should be
excluded" (R. 18-28, 26; see Addendum A).

He made no argument

challenging the validity of the alleged consent search of the
vehicle (R. 18-28, see Addendum A ) .
Defendant's oral argument on the matter was similarly
devoid of any meaningful analysis concerning his argument under
Wong Sun and Sibron.

Rather, defendant merely concluded that

"the second baggy [sic] obviously came from exploitation of . . .
an illegal search and seizure which led to its finding after the
wrongful taking of the first one" (T. 42; see Addendum A ) .
Additionally, like his memorandum, defendant's oral argument was
bereft of any challenge to the validity of his consent to search
the vehicle (T. 38-42, see Addendum A ) .
On appeal to this Court defendant asserts for the first
time that contraband discovered inside his vehicle was illegally
seized because his consent to search the vehicle was not
sufficiently attenuated from the officer's "illegal detention and
search of [his] person" (Br. of App. at 18). Defendant's
complete failure to develop this argument in the trial court
constitutes a waiver of its consideration on appeal.

State v.

Price, 827 P.2d 247, 248 n.2 (Utah App. 1992); State v.
19

Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Carter,
707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985).

The fourth amendment law

recited in defendant's brief was available for presentation in
the trial court; moreover, the record fails to indicate any
reason for defendant's failure to develop the argument below.
Absent special justification for failing to present all available
grounds in support of a suppression motion, this Court will not
rule on those grounds not addressed in the trial court.
B.

Ibid.

No Necessity for Taint Analysis

As for defendant's secondary assertion that the
contraband seized from his vehicle was discovered as a result of
the officer's "exploitation of the illegal detention and
[frisk]," for reasons set forth in Points I-II of this brief,
defendant has not demonstrated that either the protective frisk,
or the scope of the detention were illegal.

Thus, it is not

necessary for the State, or this Court, to engage in an analysis
of defendant's allegations of taint under Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at
487 (excluding evidence come at by exploitation of illegality
rather than by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint).

Because defendant's unsupported assertions

of illegality and taint under Wong Sun fail to pinpoint any clear
error in the trial court's factual findings concerning reasonable
suspicion for the protective frisk and detention, this Court
should affirm.

State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah App.),

cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989); State v. Robinson, 797
P.2d 431, 436-437 (Utah App. 1990).
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POINT IV
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS
JUSTIFIED AS INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST
In Point IV of his brief defendant again challenges the
reasonableness of the protective frisk and the detention (Br, of
App. at 19). Additionallyf defendant asserts that Trooper
Maycock did not have probable cause to search his vehicle (Br. of
App. at 19). As defendant's allegations concerning the
reasonableness of the protective frisk and the scope of detention
are addressed in Points I-II of this brief, the State's response
here will focus on the propriety of the vehicle search.
Defendant's argument concerning the validity of the vehicle
search lacks merit and should be rejected.
An exception to the probable cause and warrant
requirements of the fourth amendment "justifies warrantless
searches and seizures incident to a lawful arrest."

In re

K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah 1981); State v. Harrison, 805
P.2d 769, 784 (Utah App.) ("contemporaneous, warrantless search
of the area within an arrestee's immediate control is permissible
for the purpose of recovering weapons the arrestee might reach,
or to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence"), cert,
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).

As defendant has raised no

challenge to the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest for
possession of a controlled substance,7 the only issue on appeal

7

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) (1990) (peace officer may
make a warrantless arrest for any public offense committed or
attempted in his presence).
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is whether the seizure of contraband from defendant's vehicle was
made incident to his arrest.
The trial court did not make an express finding as to
the time of defendant's arrest; however, Trooper Maycock
testified at the suppression hearing that defendant was arrested
immediately following the protective frisk revealing the presence
of contraband on defendant's person (T. 10). Following the
administration of Miranda warnings, the officer inquired whether
defendant had "any other dope in the car" (T. 10). Defendant
said "Yes," and "advised" Trooper Maycock "where it could be
found" (T. 10). Accordingly, the trial court concluded that
"[t]he seizure of the baggie from the vehicle was pursuant to a
valid arrest" (Addendum B).
Based on the foregoing, the search of defendant's
vehicle was permissible as incident to his arrest.
P.2d at 1046.

K.K.C., 636

The cocaine found on defendant's person provided

probable cause for his arrest independent of the contraband later
seized from the vehicle.

See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) & (2)

(Supp. 1992) (prohibiting the knowing and intentional possession
and/or distribution of controlled substances).

Moreover,

defendant and Miller were standing near the vehicle at the time
of the arrest and search (T. 9-10).

The car being "within

[defendant's] immediate control," New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 460 (1981), the contraband found as a result of the vehicle
search was admissible.

See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 784 n.29 (and

cases cited therein recognizing constitutional validity of
22

searches incident to arrest where the arrestees were similarly
removed from the searched area).8

Thus, the trial court

correctly concluded that the search was justified as incident to
defendant's arrest and this Court should affirm that conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
suppress evidence should be affirmed.

Defendant's conviction

therefore should also be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 0 ^ d a y of October, 1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

KER
Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed/ postage prepaid, to
Robert L. Neeley, CAMPBELL & NEELEY, attorney for appellant, 2485
Grant Ave., Suite 200, Ogden, Utah

84401, this "jQ day of

October, 1992.

8

Because the vehicle search was justified as incident to
defendant's arrest, there is no need to consider whether the search
and seizure would also be justified under the "automobile
exception" to the warrant requirement. See K.K.C. , 636 P.2d at
1047; Belton, 453 U.S. at 462 n.6.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
vs.
Judge: D*~,/*S

JEFFREY W. ROCHELL,

L. Cm—mly

Civil No. 921700013FS

Defendant.

Comes now defendant, Jeffrey W. Rochell, by and through
his attorney, and moves the above-entitled Court to suppress all
evidence, specifically two baggies of cocaine, as the same was
illegally seized and taken from defendant contrary to the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section
14 of the State of Utah Constitution.

Upon suppression of the

above described evidence, the criminal charges against defendant
should be dismissed.
DATED this

day of F,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
DISMISS

vs.
JEFFREY W. ROCHELL,
Defendant.

Judge: D»~s/er

L. £<>*>.*£-,

Civil No. 921700013FS

Comes now defendant, Jeffrey W. Rochell, and submits the
following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of his
Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss, as follows, to-wit:

FACTS

1. On June 5, 1991, Trooper Dave Maycock, was stationary
at the St. Joes overpass on 1-15.

His patrol vehicle was facing

south and he was running radar.
2.

At approximately 2015 hours, he observed a yellow

Mustang northbound in the left lane.
M.P.H.

He estimated its speed at 65

He watched his radar unit, which showed a reading of 66

M.P.H., then it dropped to 65 M.P.H.

The speed limit in that area

is 55 M.P.H.
3.
clear.

Traffic was light

to moderate and the weather was

He pursued the vehicle, caught up to it, and initiated a
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traffic stop just north of the right hand guard rail near Carpenter
Paper, Davis County, Utah.
4.
their cars.

The driver exited the vehicle and met him between
He immediately noticed the smell of alcohol coming

from defendant

Rochell's breath.

He asked to see defendants

driver license, at which time he offered it to Trooper Maycock.
The driver was identified by his picture driver license as Jeffrey
W. Rochell, D.O.B. 3-16-70.
5.

The Trooper asked defendant Rochell how much he had

to drink, and defendant

stated

"one beer".

The Trooper had

defendant perform a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test and got no clues
as to his being intoxicated. The Trooper then advised defendant of
the reason for his stopping him and asked to see his registration.
6.

Defendant Rochell approached the passenger side of

the vehicle and opened the door.

As soon as he opened the door a

blue plastic cup with alcoholic beverage in it fell out and spilled
on the ground. The Trooper then asked the passenger for some I.D.,
the passenger stated he had none. The passenger identified himself
as Billy Gene Miller, D.O.B. 1-30-50.
7. Defendant Miller also had an obvious odor of alcohol
coming from his breath.

Defendant

Rochell found the vehicle

registration and joined the Trooper again at the rear of his
vehicle.
8.

The Trooper advised defendant Rochell to return to

MEMORANDUM
STATE VS. ROCHELL
Case No. 921700013FS
Page 3

his vehicle.

The Trooper returned to his patrol vehicle.

The

Trooper filled out a citation for defendant Rochell for speeding
65/55, and failure to wear his seatbelt. The Trooper also filled
out a citation for defendant Miller for an open container.
9.

Officer Garrido of North Salt Lake P.D. called the

Trooper on the radio and asked if he could meet Trooper Maycock.
Trooper Maycock told him his location and asked Officer Garrido to
meet the Trooper there.

Officer Garrido had to return a set of

Trooper Maycock's handcuffs he had borrowed earlier on a previous
arrest.
10.

Trooper Maycock approached the driver side of the

vehicle again and asked both occupants to step to the front of
their vehicle.

The Trooper advised them he had already seen the

one open container of alcohol and defendant Miller was receiving a
citation for it.

The Trooper advised them that he was going to

have a look into the car to see if there was another open
container, and that defendant Rochell would be cited for it if
there was.
11.

About that time, Officer Garrido pulled in behind

the Trooper's patrol vehicle. Trooper Maycock was facing south so
he could see Officer Garrido's approach and both suspects was
facing north with their backs to the vehicles.
12.

The Trooper asked both defendants if they had any

weapons, knives or needles on them that he could be stuck with
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while he was bent over looking into the car.
Defendant Miller
being asked.

volunteered everything

Both stated "no".

in his pockets

without

He had no weapons.

13.

Defendant

Rochell

just stated

something

effect of no, he didn't have any weapons on him.

to the

The Trooper saw

a bulge in his left front pocket and he tapped it with the back of
his fingers, feeling that it was something hard.
asked "what's that"?

Defendant Rochell

Trooper Maycock

reached in his pocket,

rustled around for a second and then pulled out a set of keys.

The

Trooper noticed there was still a bulge there and tapped it again
with the back of his fingers, feeling only that something was hard
in there.

The Trooper asked again "what's that"?

don't like those little pen knives."
was only change.

and added "I

Defendant Rochell stated it

The Trooper asked him to pull it out so he could

see. Defendant Rochell put his hand into his pocket again, rustled
around for a second and pulled out a handful of change.
14.

As defendant Rochell pulled out his change he also

partially exposed a plastic baggie. The Trooper pointed to the
baggie/pocket and asked "what's that"?

Defendant Rochell put his

hand into his pocket with change still in his hand and

stated

"nothing" pulling his hand back out of his pocket and concealing it
behind

his

back.

Officer

Garrido

immediately

went

for

Mr.

Rochell's hand and pulled the baggie from his hand.
15.

Officer Garrido immediately handed the baggie to
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Trooper Maycock.

In it was a powdery substance suspected to be

cocaine.
16. Both individuals were placed into custody and given
Miranda. Defendant Rochell received his rights by Trooper Maycock
and defendant Miller received his rights by Officer Garrido.
17.

Defendant Miller

denied

any

knowledge

of

any

narcotics in the vehicle.
18.

Defendant Rochell was asked by Trooper Maycock and

again by Officer Garrido if there was any other "Dope" in the car.
Defendant Rochell stated that there was another baggie just like
the one the Trooper found in his pocket, stuck between the cushions
of the passenger sear.

As was stated by him, another baggie was

found in that position.
19. Defendant Rochelle indicated to Detective Lon Bryan
the second baggie of cocaine found between the cushions of the
passenger sear was the property of Billy G. Miler.

I
THE TROOPER MAY INITIALLY ENGAGE IN A
PROTECTIVE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT ROCHELLE
IF HE REASONABLY BELIEVES HE IS IN DANGER.
Although a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in
a car than in his or her home, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,
390-93, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2068-70, 85 L.Ed. 2d 406 (1085), one does
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not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an
automobile. However, when an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic
violation, he may briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants
while he

examines the vehicle registration

and the

driver's

license. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391,
1396, 59 L.Ed 2d 660 (1979).

An officer, for his own protection,

may also order a driver out of a vehicle which has been stopped for
a traffic violation. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct.
330, 54 L.Ed. 2d 331 (1977).
U.C.A., 1953, Section 77-7-16, authorizes a peace officer
to frisk a person for dangerous weapons if he reasonably believes
he or any other person is in danger.

The section must be

interpreted to meet the constitutional requirements of Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968).

In that

case, the Supreme Court established a narrowly drawn exception to
the requirement that police obtain a warrant for all searches. The
exception applies in cases where the officer has a reasonable
belief, based on "specific and articulable facts," that the person
may be armed and dangerous.

Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. State v.

Carter, Utah 707 P.2d 656 (1985).
Although a warrant is required before the government may
intrude upon a person's reasonably expectation of privacy, an
exception to the warrant requirement is the investigative stop
situation.

The United States Supreme Court has held that a law
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enforcement officer may "in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating
possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause
to make an arrest." Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
1880, 20 L.Ed. 2d. 889 (1968).

The oft-stated test to determine

the validity of a temporary investigative stop, short of an arrest
based on probable cause, is whether the police officer can point to
specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.
Terrv, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880.

II
THE FACT THAT TROOPER MAYCOCK DID NOT
CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO INITIALLY
FRISK DEFENDANT ROCHELLE PRECLUDES
CONCLUSION THAT TROOPER HAD A REASONABLE BASIS TO SUSPECT DEFENDANT ROCHELLE
MIGHT BE ARMED AND DANGEROUS PERMITTING
SEARCH OF HIS PERSON BEFORE SEARCHING
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE.
It is obvious from the facts of this case Trooper Maycock
had no reasonable basis or suspicion he may articulate that
defendant Rochelle was armed and dangerous justifying a search of
his person.

Trooper Maycock did not consider defendant armed and

dangerous as evidenced by the following:
1.

Defendant upon being stopped by the Trooper did not

flee or attempt to evade the Trooper.
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2.

Defendant exited his vehicle and met him between

their vehicles.
3.

Defendant produced his driver's license.

4.

Defendant cooperated in performing field sobriety

tests requested by the Trooper.
5. The Trooper was standing extremely close to defendant
in order to conduct Horizontal Gaze Nystagas Test.
6.

The Trooper did not initially frisk the defendant

evidencing no fear or suspicion defendant was armed and dangerous.
7. Defendant went to his vehicle with Trooper to obtain
his automobile registration.
8. Trooper allowed defendant to get into his vehicle to
obtain registration evidencing Trooper had no fear or suspicion
that

defendant

might

obtain

a

weapon

while

searching

for

registration.
9.

Defendant

cooperated

and

produced

his

vehicle

registration.
10.

Defendant joined the Trooper at the rear of his

vehicle with the registration.
11. Trooper decides to issue citations for offenses and
allows defendant to return to his vehicle evidencing no fear that
defendant might obtain a weapon from the vehicle.
12.

Defendant

exits vehicle and steps to front of

vehicle when requested by Trooper to receive citation.
3
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13.

Trooper then indicates for the first time he is

going to search the parties for weapons before searching their
vehicle for alcohol. He was not searching the vehicle for weapons.
14. Both defendants indicated they had no weapons on
their person.

Trooper searches defendant Miller and finds no

weapon.
15.

Trooper persists in searching defendant Rochelle

until defendant empties his front pocket.
From the facts and sequence of events in the case, it is
clear the Trooper had no fear the defendant had a weapon on his
person or one in the vehicle as he allowed defendant to get back
into his vehicle unattended.

Therefore, the frisk of defendant

Rochelle prior to searching the vehicle was not for dangerous
weapons based upon a reasonable belief or suspicion and therefore
not permitted by Terry v. Ohio or 77-7-16 U.C.A., as amended. The
baggie

of

cocaine

seized

from

defendant's

person

should

be

suppressed.
Ill
EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT'S MOTOR
VEHICLE WAS A DIRECT RESULT FROM EVIDENCE
WRONGFULLY SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT AND IS
FRUIT OF PREVIOUS ILLEGAL SEARCH.
The second baggie of cocaine seized from defendant's
motor vehicle was discovered

as a direct

wrongfully seized from defendant.

result

of evidence

The second baggie of cocaine

MEMORANDUM
STATE VS. ROCHELL
Case No, 921700013FS
Page 10

found in the vehicle is fruit discovered from the previous illegal
search of defendant's person and should be excluded.

Wong Sun v.

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441 (1963);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed. 2d 917
(1968).
Further, defendant Rochell indicated to the officers on
the scene the second baggie of cocaine was not his but that of
defendant Miller who put it between the cushions of his seat.

CONCLUSION
The search of defendant's Rochelle person by Trooper
Maycock was

illegal

Constitution and
suppressed.

contrary

the evidence

to the United States
produced

there

and

Utah

from should

be

The fruits derived from the illegal search should

likewise be suppressed and all evidence derived as a result thereof
suppressed from evidence.
Respectfully submitted this

N

2JLL1

day of February,

ROBERTL7NEEi^Y
J
Attorney for Defendant Roche/le
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and Dismiss
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attorney, William

K.

/

McGuire, Davis County Deputy Attorney, this J?y
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1992.

\SLJrf-*^
uM*w ?r?&

1

before the Court, that this evidence should not be

2

suppressed.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. NEELEY:

Mr. Neeley?
In response, your Honor, I would like to

5

point out some language to you.

6

already familiar with it and has the memorandums on file.

7

But my understanding of the Terry v. Ohio case as well as

8

Section 77-6-16 of the Utah Code authorizes a police officer

9

to search a party he's confronting if he reasonably believes

10
11

I suspect the Court's

he is endangered.
And the Court has set forth something that has been

12

described as a narrowly drawn exception to the requirement

13

that police always obtain a warrant before any searches.

14

Searches per say are unreasonable unless they fall within the

15

exception. And the exception set forth in Terry applies in a

16

case where the officer has reasonable belief based upon facts

17

that he can articulate and be specific about that this person

18

must be armed and dangerous.

19

I emphasize this, your Honor, because it's apparent

20

that Trooper Haycock has been in the.company of Mr. Rochell

21

at this point in time for in excess of 15 to 20 to 25 minutes

22

by the time they get up to the car jthe second time. And he

23

candidly has indicated to you that there has been absolutely

24

nothing about Mr. Rochell £hat alerted him to any weapons.

25

He was not angry.

He was cooperative.

<Y.ff>. <n

JU*A—

He did not make any

s*_...a n _

i

inadvertent gestures, nothing which would lead him to believe
that he was armed or dangerous.
I think it's also very crucial and very candidly
stated by the trooper that he had formed the intent to search
his person when he walked up to the car the second time. He
hadn't seen any bulges in the pocket.
step out.

He hadn't asked him to

He had absolutely no reason at that time to

suspect that either party was armed or dangerous. And he
forms the intent that he will search their person prior to
searching the contents of the vehicle.
Now, it would appear to me that the longer you're
with someone on a traffic stop, the greater feel you have for
the type of stop that you have.

Is it a dangerous one, or

are the parties cooperating and so forth?

And I would

suspect that based on all of the evidence before the Court,
there is nothing out of the ordinary, nothing unusual.

The

only unusual factor being the open container that fell out.
But there was nothing to alert the officer that these people
had any weapons on them.
there were no weapons.

In fact, as the case turns out,

The officer forms the intent to

search not based on any facts that he can specifically
articulate to the Court.
And I submit that under the Terry v. Ohio and under
Section 77-6-16 that he had no right to search the person.
If he felt endangered, if he felt that they had a weapon or
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if they were being uncooperative, if they were mad at him, if
they were angry, those might be facts that he could tell the
Court.

But that's not the case. These people have done

absolutely nothing to alert him to the fact that he might be
in danger*
Secondly, your Honor, I believe that the trooper
exceeded the scope and the duration of his initial stop when
he orders both of the parties out of the vehicle so that he
can search the vehicle and he can search their person.

I did

not cite this particular case, but after getting counsel's
memorandum, and I will give the Court a copy of it and
counsel a copy of it.

There's State of Utah vs. Hargraves,

February 7th, 1991, case that the Court of Appeals decided,
and that basically is a traffic stop. And the Court stated:
"If the trial court finds that the defendant
Hargraves was in custody throughout this incident91

—

and there's no question the trooper's indicated these
parties were in his custody, they were not free to
leave —

"the Court must determine whether the custody

was lawful in its scope and duration."
And you read the cases under Terry V. Ohio and the
following cases.
"The detention must be temporary and last no longer
than is necessary to affectuate the purpose of the
stop."
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1

And I submit that he had concluded and had done

2

everything that he had to when he filled out that citation

3

I and walked up there and was prepared to hand the citation to

4

I the parties. And I submit that he has exceeded the duration

5

and the scope of his initial stop when he orders them out of

6

I the vehicle to step forward so he can search them and search

7

the vehicle.

8

I

Thirdly, I would submit that he had no probable

9

I cause to search the vehicle.

It would be erroneous to saying

10

that any time you detect the odor of alcohol about someone's

11

person, you can search their vehicle.

12

trooper's reasoning, he had two people with the odor of

13

alcohol about their breath, about their person.

14

one open container.

15

passing by or observing the inside of that vehicle to alert

16

him to any other open container.

17

not have probable cause to search the vehicle simply because

18

the driver has the odor of alcohol about his person.

19
20
21

If you follow the

He observes

He does not see any objects when he's

And*I submit that he does

And the only other point that I would like to make,
I your Honor, is there was a fairly recent case, just decided
last month —

well, actually it looks like the end of

22

I January, January 30th, 1992.

23

I also a traffic stop. And in that case, the Court of Appeals

24
25

It's State vs. Godina-Luna,

emphasized again that:
"The length and scope of the detention must be

U(cuu
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1

j

strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances

2

which rendered its initiation" —

the initial stop —

3

"permissible.

4

have been satisfied, the individual must be allowed to

Once the reasons for the initial stop

5

I

proceed on his or or her way*

Any further temporary

6

I

detention for investigative questioning after the

7

fulfillment of the purpose for the initial traffic stop

6

is justified under the fourth amendment only if the

9

detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious

10 J
11
12

criminal activity."
I submit the trooper did not.

And I will give the

Court and counsel a copy of both of those cases which I did

13 I not attach to the memorandum in as much as counsel's
14 I memorandum alerted me to those issues.
15 I

I would submit it, your Honor.

I would ask that

16

the baggy of cocaine found on his person be suppressed and

17

that the baggy of cocaine found in the passenger seat

18 I likewise be suppressed inasmuch as the second baggy obviously
19

came from exploitation of what I believe to be an illegal

20 I search and seizure which led to its finding after the
21
22 I
23 I
24 I
25 I

Wrongful taking of the first one.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Thank you.

Any rebuttal?
MR. McGUIRE:

Just one matter, your Honor.

With regard to the Hargraves and Godina-Luna

Alut.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL. DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

THE STATE OF UTAH,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 921700013

JEFFREY WARREN ROCHELL,
Defendant.

This matter came on for hearing on Defendant's Motion to
Suppress on the 18th day of March, 1992. Defendant was present and
represented by Robert Neeley, the State was represented by William
K. McGuire.

The Court, having heard evidence and considered the

memoranda of the parties, hereby enters its
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1. Defendant was stopped for speeding 65 miles per hour
in a 55 mile per hour zone.
2.

Officer David Maycock noticed smell of alcohol on

defendant's breath.
3.
fell

from

Upon securing the registration, an open container

the passenger

side of the vehicle.

The officer

determined it contained alcohol.
4.

The passenger in the vehicle had also been consuming

an alcoholic beverage.

5.

The officer proceeded

to write out citations;

speeding and no seat belt to defendant and open container to the
passenger. He then determined to search the vehicle for additional
open containers since both occupants had been drinking, but only
one container had been seen at that time.
6. The officer askesd each occupant whether they had any
weapons.

The passengerf Mr. Miller, said no, csmptied his pockets

and turned around to show that he had no weapons.

The defendant

was hesitant in answering no and did not offer the contents of his
pocket.
7. The officer noticed a bulge in defendant's left front
pocket measuring 3-1/2 inches in diameter and 1 to 1-1/2 inches
deep.

The officer believed it could have been a knife or other

weapon.
8. After the officer asked what the bulge was, defendant
reached into his pocket and pulled out keys.

However, the bulge

was still present and the officer found it was still hard.

The

defendant then reached in and pulled out coins and as he did so a
portion of a plastic baggie was exposed.
9. The officer asked what it was and the defendant said
"nothing" and pulled his hand out of the pocket and placed it
behind his back.
10.

A

second officer, approaching

from the rear,

observed a baggie of white powder and seized it.
11. Following the seizure of the baggie, defendant told
the officer that another baggie was in the car and it was seized.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The initial stop of defendant's vehicle was a proper
traffic stop and not a pretext stop.
2.

The officer had probable cause to believe that

another alcoholic beverage was in the vehicle and therefore a
search of the vehicle for that purpose was appropriate.
3.

It was reasonable for the officer to determine if

either of the occupants were armed with weapons prior to commencing
a search of the vehicle. Based upon what he observed, the officer
had a right to conduct a pat down of both occupants.
4.

The seizure of the plastic baggie from defendant's

hand was permissible.
5.

The seizure of the baggie from the vehicle was

pursuant to a valid arrest and appropriate impound of the vehicle.
Based

upon

the

foregoing

Findings

of

Facts

and

Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby ORDERS that defendant's motion
to suppress is hereby denied.
DATED this

/^

day of

LZ^^

BY THE COURT:

, 1992.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct unexecuted
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, with
postage prepaid thereon, to Robert Neeley, Attorney for Defendant
at 2495 Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah
of June, 1992.

:retary/
Secfeta

84401, this 3rd day

